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We investigate the impact of the presence of women in top management on bank performance
controlling for bank specific factors, ownership and governance. By making use of sample of 70 Indonesian banks in a cross section study, we find strong evidence that the presence of women in the
executives is negatively associated with firm performance. Moreover, we examine the moderating
effect of TMT organizational tenure and TMT age. However, only little evidence is found in the effect
of our moderating variables.
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Introduction
It is generally argued that women are perceived less risk taking and less overconfidence
than men. Some scholars in the area of behavioral finance have provided empirical evidence
(e.g. Barber & Odean, 200; Charness & Gneezy,
2012; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Charness and
Gneezy (2012) provide evidence in their experimental study that women invest less which
means they are more financially risk averse
than men. Barber and Odean (2001), studying
investment behavior of households in common
stocks, find that men trade much more than
women due to their overconfidence behavior.
Likewise, in the corporate finance literature,
it has been widely considered that there are behavior differences between male and female executives in making corporate finance decisions
which appear that women tend to behave less
risk taking and less aggressive. For instance,

Huang and Kisgen (2013) investigate the difference in investment decision made by female
and male executives. They conclude that men
relatively overconfidence in financial decision
compared to women. Higher risk-taking strategy could be associated with higher performance.
However, on the other hand, some studies
also provide evidence that the presence of women on top management team leads to better performance for firms. Specifically, Jurkus, Park
and Woodard (2011) reveal that the presence of
female officers could reduce the agency costs.
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find evidence that
female directors improve governance of firms.
Smith, Smith, and Verner (2007) also reveal that
the proportion of women in top management is
positively associated with firm performance.
At the officer level, Beck, Behr, and Guettler
(2013) investigate the performance differences
between male and female bank loan officers.
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They find that loans screened and monitored by
female loan officers are less likely to be nonperforming compared to those of male officers.
They argue that female loan officers may be
better in monitoring effort of borrowers.
Strategic management scholars have also
studied the behavior differences of women and
men on the boards of firms and its impact on
corporate performance. Most of them refer to
the upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007; Hermann & Datta,
2005) in which demographic data is used as
proxies for managers’ experiences, values, dispositions, and beliefs. Gender is supposed to
have an impact on the differences in decision
making of managers. Some also argue that resource dependent theory could explain the effect of gender diversity on performance as the
more diversified the board, the more information could be provided (García-Meca, GarcíaSánchez, & Martínez-Ferrero, 2015; Smith et
al., 2007).
The present paper re-investigates the effect
of women on the top management on performance by studying Indonesian banks. Indonesia is an emerging market which its financial
development mostly relies on banking as a locomotive due to the capital markets is relatively
still underdeveloped (Trinugroho, Agusman, &
Tarazi, 2014). Our focus here, however, is to
empirically examine the effect of top management diversity, more specifically in gender on
performance of banks. As it is argued by Adams
and Ferreira (2009), the presence of women on
the board creates the dynamic environment
which subsequently improves the governance
of firm. Moreover, the expectation that the presence of women improves bank performance
comes from the fact agency costs are diminished with the greater proportion of women on
the boards (Jurkus et al., 2011). However, on
the other hand, women presence in the top management team may lead to poor performance as
they tend to less risk taking strategy.
We continue the work of Untoro, Angriawan,
Trinugroho, and Rahardian(2015) who document that diversification strategy of Indonesian
banks are also negatively affected by organization tenure of its board of directors. The long-
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er the tenure of board members it would lead
banks become less diversified in their business
strategy. Moreover, they find that this negative
effect is mitigated by firm’s prior performance.
We also follow the study of Trinarningsih,
Husa, Untoro, Trinugroho, and Sutaryo (2015)
in which they contend that the effect of bank diversification strategy on performance depends
on the top management characteristics such as
education, tenure and age.
Going deeper, we also look at the impact of
two moderating variables which are the organizational tenure and average age of top management teams. Arguably, on the one hand, the
shorter the organization tenure, it would mitigate the negative effect of women on top management team on performance. On the other
hand, it could also be argued that the longer
the tenure could reduce the positive impact of
gender diversity in TMT on bank performance.
Similarly, it is widely considered younger managers tend to take more risk in their decision
which subsequently mitigates the negative effect of women in top management on performance. On the contrary, it could also be argued
that the older the executives, it could diminish
the positive impact of women presence in the
top management team on the outcomes.

Literature Review
Gender Diversity and Bank Performance
An extensive body of literature has studied
the roleof board (or top management) diversity
on firm performance. Some theoretical frameworks have been provided to explain such issue. In the strategic management perspective,
upper-echelons theory and resource dependent
theory are often used to justify the role of gender diversity or women on board on corporate
strategy and performance. The upper-echelons
theory claims that firm strategy andorganizational outcomes are reflections of the top managers’ demographics characteristics (Untoro
et al., 2015). Therefore, firm performance is
strongly affected by top management demographic factors. The other perspective comes
from the resource-dependent theory in which
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diverse board members could bring more
unique information and perspectives (GarcíaMeca et al., 2015).
Smith et al. (2007) and Nielsen and Huse
(2010) have provided a summary of literature
review on the arguments underlying the effect
of board diversity on firm performance. Basically, there are two competing perspectives.
The proponents argue thata more heterogeneous directors or managers (with different skills,
abilities, knowledge, and information) could be
able tomake better decisions due to they have
more alternatives. Moreover, diversified board
could also be seen as a good signal of customers (Smith et al., 2007). On the other hand, the
opposites contend that difficulties in coordinating and decision making as well as potential
conflicts may be more experienced in the more
heterogeneous boards.
The present paper investigates the effect of
diversity in the top management, more specifically gender diversity, on performance. Post
and Byron (2015) provide comprehensive
views on the effect of women presence on the
board or executives. First, taking the upper
echelons theory, they argue that female executives tend to bring different cognitive frames
for example: having advanced education, having strengthin marketing and sales, and having
unique understandings of consumer markets.
Second, the presence of women on the board
or top management could also influence the
process of decision-making. They are more cooperative in decision-making rather than strict
to the rules and regulations (Bart & McQueen,
2013). Some previous studies have also provided empirical evidence. For example, Smith
et al. (2007), by studying Danish firms, document that the proportion of women in the top
management tends to bring positive effects on
firm performance. Focusing on banking firms,
Pathan and Faff (2013), using data of US bank
holding companies, show that gender diversity
improves performance but only to some extent;
it diminishes after the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and during the crisis period.
Similarly, García-Meca et al. (2015), in a cross
country study, empirically examine the effect
of board diversity in gender and nationality on

bank performance. They do find that gender
diversity on the board significantly improves
bank performance. However, this effect would
be lower in the countries with weaker regulatory environment and investor protection. Those
previous studies imply that gender diversity or
women presence on the board (or top management) mostly bring positive effect for firm performance.

Research Methods
We re-examine the effect of top management team diversity in gender on bank performance. Moreover, we test the moderating effect
of organizational tenure and age in relationship
between women on top executives and bank
performance. It is a cross-sectional research in
which data is collected for single period that is
in the year of 2009. Our data is gathered from
several sources. The financial information
comes from financial reports, while the data on
the curriculum vitae of top management team
members are taken from the annual reports of
banks. It should be noted that Indonesian banking adopts the two tier system in which there
are two boards. The board of directors refers
to the top management team, while the board
of commissioners performs as the supervision
(Nam & Nam, 2004; Untoro et al., 2015). In
this research, we only use the board of directors
(managers) to reflect the top management team.
We use two proxies to represent the presence
of women on the top management. First, we use
a categorical (dummy) variable (D_WOMEN)
taking a value of 1 for firms having female
board member and 0 otherwise. Second, we use
the proportion of women on the top management team (PROP_WOMEN).
Our dependent variable is bank performance
which is measured by the ratio of return on
assets (ROA) as well as the ratio of return on
equity (ROE). We introduce two moderating
variables: 1) the average organizational tenure
(TENURE) which is measured as the mean of
organization tenure of top management team
members and 2) the average age of top management team members (AGE) which is proxied by the mean of age of top management team
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members.
We take into account some control variables.
First, to control for the ownership issue, we include two variables1, a dummy for foreign banks
(FOB) taking a value of 1 for foreign banks (including joint venture banks) and 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable to represent the state-owned
banks (SOB) is also included. Second, as some
might argue that the banks’ performance is affected by how well they govern their banks, we
incorporate the ratio of number of independent
board ofcommissioner members to total board
of commissioner members (PROP_INDEP). An
extensive body of literature has discussed the
role of independent board members as a corporate governance mechanism (e.g. Anderson &
Reeb, 2004; Black & Kim, 2012). Independent
board members could be considered to represent the interests of minority (public). Its presence could prevent insider self-dealing which
subsequently could improve firm performance
(Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang,2015). Finally, the
natural logarithm of total assets (LN_ASSET)
is involved in our model to account for the difference performance between large and small
banks.
The empirical models to be estimated using
ordinary least square (OLS) are presented as
follows:
ROAi = α0 + α1D_WOMENi + α2FOBi+ α3SOBi
		 + α4PROP_INDEPi + α5LN_ASSETSi 		
		 + εi,t
(1)
ROAi = α0 + α1PROP_WOMENi + α2FOBi
+ α SOBi + α4PROP_INDEPi
		 3
		 + α5LN_ASSETSi + εi,t
(2)
ROEi = α0 + α1D_WOMENi + α2FOBi+ α3SOBi
		 + α4PROP_INDEPi + α5LN_ASSETSi 		
		 + εi,t
(3)
ROEi = α0 + α1PROP_WOMENi + α2FOBi
		 + α3SOBi + α4PROP_INDEPi
		 + α5LN_ASSETSi + εi,t
(4)
ROAi = α0 + α1D_WOMENi + α2FOBi+ α3SOBi
		 + α4PROP_INDEPi + α5LN_ASETSi
		 + α6TENUREi+ α7AGEi
		 + α8D_WOMEN*TENUREi

(5)
		 + α9D_WOMEN*AGEi + εi,t
ROAi = α0 + α1PROP_WOMENi + α2FOBi
+ α SOBi + α4PROP_INDEPi
		 3
		 + α5LN_ASSETSi + α6TENUREi
+ α AGEi
		 7
		 + α8PROP_WOMEN*TENUREi
		 + α9PROP_WOMEN*AGEi + εi,t (6)
ROEi = α0 + α1D_WOMENi + α2FOBi
+ α SOBi + α4PROP_INDEPi
		 3
		 + α5LN_ASSETSi + α6TENUREi
+ α AGEi + α8D_WOMEN*TENUREi
		 7
		 + α9D_WOMEN*AGEi + εi,t
(7)
ROEi = α0 + α1PROP_WOMENi + α2FOBi
+ α SOBi + α4PROP_INDEPi
		 3
		 + α5LN_ASSETSi + α6TENUREi
+ α AGEi
		 7
		 + α8PROP_WOMEN*TENUREi
		 + α9PROP_WOMEN*AGEi + εi,t (8)
Equations 1 – 4 are employed to test the
regressions without moderating variables.
We introduce our moderating variables in the
equations 5 – 8. D_WOMEN*TENURE and
D_WOMEN*AGE are the interactions of D_
WOMEN with TENURE and AGE, respectively. While, PROP_WOMEN*TENURE and
PROP_WOMEN*AGE stands for the interactions of PROP_WOMEN with TENURE and
AGE, respectively. We do not include the dummy for women in top management team and the
proportion of women in the top management
team concurrently as these two variables are
strongly correlated.

Results and Discussions
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of
variables. The average return on assets and return on equity are 2.8% and 19%. 47.1% of banks
have women in their top management team;
however, the average proportion of women in
the executives is only 11.3%. Foreign banks in
our sample account for 12.9%, while 42.9% of

There are three kinds of banks in Indonesia based on ownership structure. First, state-owned banks (including regional
development banks) are controlled by central government (regional government). The second one is foreign banks (including joint venture banks). The last one is domestic-private banks. In this paper, as we use two dummy variables to
represent state-owned banks and foreign banks, domestic-private banks are the benchmark.

1
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
This table exhibits the descriptive statistics of variables. ROA is the ratio of return on assets. ROE is the ratio of return on equity. D_WOMEN
is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for firms having female board member and 0 otherwise. PROP_WOMEN is the proportion of women
on the top management team. FOB is a dummy variable for foreign banks. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks. PROP_INDEP
is the ratio of number of independent board of commissioner members to total board of commissioner members. LN_ASSETS is the natural
logarithm of total assets. TENURE is the average organization tenure of top management team members. AGE is the mean of age of top
management team members.

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness

ROA
0.028
0.026
0.075
-0.006
0.018
0.437

ROE
0.190
0.179
0.473
-0.098
0.124
0.252

D_
WOMEN
0.471
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.503
0.114

PROP_
WOMEN
0.113
0.000
0.400
0.000
0.136
0.706

FOB
0.129
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.337
2.219

SOB
0.429
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.498
0.289

PROP_
INDEP
0.416
0.500
1.000
0.000
0.266
-0.337

LN_
ASSET
16.040
16.000
19.829
12.914
1.559
0.598

TENURE
11.965
9.500
29.000
0.000
8.735
0.517

AGE
51.084
51.000
56.200
42.667
3.049
-0.501

Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Variables
This table exhibits the descriptive statistics of variables. ROA is the ratio of return on assets. ROE is the ratio of return on equity. D_WOMEN
is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for firms having female board member and 0 otherwise. PROP_WOMEN is the proportion of women
on the top management team. FOB is a dummy variable for foreign banks. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks. PROP_INDEP
is the ratio of number of independent board of commissioner members to total board of commissioner members. LN_ASSETS is the natural
logarithm of total assets. TENURE is the average organization tenure of top management team members. AGE is the mean of age of top
management team members.

ROA
ROE
D_WOMEN
PROP_WOMEN
FOB
SOB
PROP_INDEP
LN_ASSET
TENURE
AGE

ROA
1.000
0.765
-0.500
-0.451
-0.070
0.567
-0.158
0.005
0.404
0.109

ROE

D_
WOMEN

PROP_
WOMEN

FOB

SOB

PROP_
INDEP

LN_
ASSET

TENURE

AGE

1.000
-0.518
-0.514
-0.320
0.713
-0.054
0.143
0.570
0.386

1.000
0.886
0.150
-0.587
0.005
0.211
-0.399
-0.177

1.000
0.226
-0.569
-0.087
-0.013
-0.372
-0.167

1.000
-0.333
-0.042
0.006
-0.377
-0.341

1.000
-0.034
0.054
0.627
0.429

1.000
0.080
-0.074
-0.027

1.000
-0.140
0.096

1.000
0.280

1.000

our observations are state-owned banks. The
average proportion of independent members
on the board of commissioners is 41.6% which
is more than the requirement of the regulator
(33%). Average tenure of top management team
members is 11.96 years, while the average of
age is 51.08 years.
Going deeper, we look at the characteristics
of women in the top management in our sample. As for the foreign and state-owned banks,
most of female executives are professionalhaving extensive experiences in financial and or
non-financial industries. In the private domestic
banks, some of female executives are member
of families which are the controlling shareholders of the banks.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of
variables. Both the dummy of women in the
TMT and the proportion of women in the TMT
are negatively and significantly correlated with

return on assets as well as with return on equity.
The correlation between state-owned banks and
performance (ROA and ROE) are positive and
significant. Organizational tenure is positively
correlated with bank performance. Likewise,
average age of TMT members is positively associated with ROA and ROE. Surprisingly, the
proportion of independent members of board
commissioners is found to have negative correlation with bank performance.
Regression Results
Table 3 presents the basic regression results.
Column 1 and 2 are regression results for ROA
(equation 1 and 2), while column 1 and 2 are regression results for ROE (equation 3 and 4). In
line with those presented in the correlation matrix, our empirical results find strong evidence
that banks having women on their top manage-
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Table 3. Regression Results
This table presents the basic regression results. ROA is the ratio of return on assets. ROE is the ratio of return on equity. D_WOMEN is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 for firms having female board member and 0 otherwise. PROP_WOMEN is the proportion of women
on the top management team. TENURE is the average organization tenure of top management team members. FOB is a dummy variable for
foreign banks. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks. PROP_INDEP is the ratio of number of independent board of commissioner
members to total board of commissioner members. LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets. TENURE is the average organization
tenure of top management team members. AGE is the mean of age of top management team members. The values in parentheses are
t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ROA
D_WOMEN
PROP_WOMEN
FOB
SOB
PROP_INDEP
LN_ASSETS
Constant
Method
Number of Banks
AdjR-Squared

ROE

1
-0.009**
(-2.141)

0.005
(1.061)
0.015***
(3.376)
-0.009
(-1.444)
0.001
(0.475)
0.019
(1.068)
OLS
70
0.351

2

-0.016*
(-1.843)
0.007
(1.281)
0.017***
(3.870)
-0.010
(-1.556)
-0.000
(-0.125)
0.029
(1.576)
OLS
70
0.339

ment team have lower performance (both ROA
and ROE) than those without women in the top
executives. If we use the second proxy which
is the proportion of women in the top management team, the results show negative and significant effect on ROA, but no significant impact on ROE.These results are not similar with
most previous studies on this issue (e.g. Smith
et al., 2007; Pathan & Faff, 2013; García-Meca
et al., 2015). Those prior papers find evidence
that women presence or gender diversity in the
management (or on the board) bring positive effect on firm performance.
Therefore, this contrary finding of this paper should be interpreted cautiously. Perhaps,
the negative effect of women presence in the
top management team of bank on performance
is driven by the fact that in an emerging country, market for banking is quite large. A huge
portion of populations are unserved which
therefore still unbanked and underbanked even
though such markets are most likely to generate
large profit for banks. In turn, it strongly needs
more expansion and penetration of commercial
banks. Aggressive and risk taking behaviors of
bankers are needed in order to lead the bank
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3
-0.052**
(-2.032)

-0.030
(-0.942)
0.144***
(5.336)
-0.029
(-0.824)
0.014**
(2.135)
-0.071
(-0.673)
OLS
74
0.543

4

-0.137
(-1.484)
-0.023
(-0.714)
0.156***
(6.051)
-0.036
(-0.982)
0.011
(1.636)
-0.023
(-0.219)
OLS
74
0.530

perform expansively. Female executives are associated with less risky financial decision and
strategy (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Moreover,
as argued by Wright and Tellei (1993), demand
for white-collarwomen managers in Indonesia
is growing significantly and educated women
could fill those positions. However, there are
some constraints on that issue which come
from the cultural value,style of organizational
behavior, and the stereotypes regarding women
in management.
Table 4 shows the regression results when
we introduce our two moderating variables.
Column 1 and 2 are regression results for ROA
(equation 5 and 6), while column 3 and 4 are regression results for ROE (equation 7 and 8).We
only find significant effect of the contingency
role of organization tenure on the link between
women presence in the executives and performance. The coefficient is negative which means
the longer the tenure of top management team
in the bank; it exacerbates the negative effect
of women presence on performance. Nevertheless, we do not find evidence on the moderating
effect of age in the relationship between gender
diversity in the management and performance.
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Table 4. Regression Results with Moderating Variables
This table presents the basic regression results with moderating variables. ROA is the ratio of return on assets. ROE is the ratio of return
on equity. D_WOMEN is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for firms having female board member and 0 otherwise. PROP_WOMEN
is the proportion of women on the top management team. TENURE is the average organization tenure of top management team members.
FOB is a dummy variable for foreign banks. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks. PROP_INDEP is the ratio of number of
independent board of commissioner members to total board of commissioner members. LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets.
TENURE is the average organization tenure of top management team members. AGE is the mean of age of top management team members.
D_WOMEN*TENURE and D_WOMEN*AGE are the interactions of D_WOMEN with TENURE and AGE, respectively. While, PROP_
WOMEN*TENURE and PROP_WOMEN*AGE stands for the interactions of PROP_WOMEN with TENURE and AGE, respectively. The
values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ROA
D_WOMEN
PROP_WOMEN
FOB
SOB
PROP_INDEP
LN_ASSETS
TENURE
AGE
D_WOMEN*TENURE
D_WOMEN*AGE

0.005
(0.884)
0.015**
(2.658)
-0.009
(-1.378)
0.001
(0.673)
0.000
(0.860)
-0.001
(-1.132)
-0.000
(-0.338)
0.001
(0.451)

PROP_
WOMEN*TENURE
PROP_WOMEN*AGE
Constant
Method
Number of Banks
R-Squared

ROE

1
-0.036
(-0.579)

0.062
(1.312)
OLS
70
0.332

2

0.003
(0.015)
0.006
(1.023)
0.016***
(2.945)
-0.009
(-1.373)
0.00006
(0.051)
0.000
(0.929)
-0.001
(-0.747)

-0.001
(-0.565)
-0.000
(-0.083)
0.054
(1.222)
OLS
70
0.319

Results of our control variables show that
state-owned banks have higher financial performance than other banks. This result is consistent in all models. It is in line with the findings
of Nys et al. (2015) and Sutopo and Trinugroho
(2015) that state-owned banks may have some
advantages of their position especially to collect funding with lower cost which subsequently improve their performance. It may also
confirm our argument on the negative effect of
women directors on performance. State-owned
banks typically enjoy “quite life” in an emerging market as they have higher market power
2

3
0.131
(0.392)

-0.013
(-0.414)
0.101***
(3.227)
-0.014
(-0.399)
-0.016**
(2.352)
0.004**
(2.608)
0.005
(1.059)
-0.005*
(-1.964)
-0.002
(-0.377)

-0.405
(1.540)
OLS
74
0.574

4

1.173
(0.865)
-0.013
(-0.394)
0.111***
(3.603)
-0.017
(-0.500)
0.010
(1.595)
0.004**
(2.499)
0.006
(1.310)

-0.022*
(-1.979)
-0.021
(-0.808)
-0.382
(-1.545)
OLS
74
0.565

due to the large unserved markets. Little evidence is found that performance of large banks
is higher than small banks. However, we do find
significant coefficients for the dummy variable
representing foreign banks and the proportion
of independent commissioners.
Robustness Checks2
To have more confident results, we do some
robustness checks. First, we change the dependent variable which is ROA at time t to the
ROA at the time t+1 as one may argue that the

Tables of robustness checks are available upon request.
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effect of board diversity on performance is for
the following period. The result of our main
variable remains unchanged. Second, we turn
the proxies of bank performance to net interest margins (NIM). Interest margin is the difference between interest rate loans and interest
rate on deposits which could reflect the profitability of bank. Again, the effect of women in
the top management team on bank performance
is negative and significant.

Conclusions
Our empirical results provide robust findings that the presence of women in the top
management team is negatively associated with
bank performance. We argue that the negative

effect may be explained by the specific context
of this research. Indonesia is the fourth most
populous country and an emerging market,
therefore the business expansion of banks to
serve the unbanked and underbanked markets
which is quite profitable is strongly needed. To
do so, it requires aggressive and more confident
top management team which is associated with
male directors.
We also conclude that organization tenure of
top management team exacerbates the negative
effect of women executives on performance.
However, we do not find evidence that age of
top management team members mitigate or
strengthen the relationship between women in
top management and bank performance.
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